| "Due Diligence" in U.S. Agriculture |
|---|
1. The inventor develops his innovative technology. Cooperators, customers, and independent researchers support the developer's performance claims.
2. Without hesitation, the self-appointed authorities of Ag (from government
and university, who have been --funded for years on taxpayer dollars-- to develop
technologies to produce comparable benefits, but who haven't quite gotten there
yet) pontificate.
Feigning "objectivity", --without having even seen the technology,
without having even spoken to a customer, and IN SPITE of having spoken to a
well-respected colleague who has VALIDATED it-- they proclaim that the technology
does not meet with their approval --that it is well below Their technical
standards-- therefore unworthy of any investment, and they heap suspicion
upon the inventor for not giving these federally-funded Competitors, upon command,
all their trade secrets and everything else of value that comprises their invention.
Some industry scientists join in, dancing around the fact altogether that their
employer has no plans to ever make their trade secrets or their proprietary
material publicly available, NEVER EVER --regardless of any arbitrarily-proclaimed
Societal Need for such facts.
3. Based upon 1 above, the developer is approached by a large entity. --If the
large entity is very, very large--, the developer may be simultaneoulsy,
but "independently", approached by the large entity AND a smaller
entity which just happens to depend upon the larger one for annual income. Heady
compliments are showered upon the developer. Yes, "heady" compliments.
4. Using the convenient, but unfounded, disparagement by the "objective
authorities of Ag", the large entity successfully negotiates a preliminary
"Evaluation Agreement" that is unduly favorable to its own undisclosed,
competitive business interests.
5. With that negotiation success under its belt, the large entity then arranges
to have the device "tested". BUT, these "tests" unanimously,
IGNORE the inventor's a) directions for installation, b) directions for usage,
c) directions for maintenance, and d) typically ignore the purpose altogether
for which the inventor developed the product.
6. By design, the "test" results are "unacceptably" poor,
bearing No Resemblance Whatsoever to the many results recorded by the satisfied
customers and the other independent parties that evaluated the technology based
exactly on the purpose for which it is sold.
6.1 No offer is made, because during the "evaluation period" the large
entity learned how to get around the legally proprietary aspects of the technology
(the patent and/or the trade secrets). The large entity then makes plans to
manufacture and sell "its own" competitive units.
6.2 OR Even though the results are bad --so "bad" that NO OFFER
SHOULD BE MADE--, a low-ball offer is made. That's Right, even though the "results"
indicate that the technology would be a complete legal liability, --a disaster
for any manufacturer that would dare to commercialize it--, and that the potential
investor should immmediatly put as much distance between the technology and
itself as it can; inexplicably, the large entity still wants the supposedly
hopelessly, "inaccurate" technology.
6.2.1 The inventor accepts the poor offer to alleviate accrued debt or other
liabilities.
6.2.2 OR he says "I don't need you", as CTI stated many, many
times, typically before step 4., where only the names and the faces changed.
6.2.2.1 If there were simultaneous negotiations with a smaller entity (which
is dependent upon the larger one) then a second, but "independent",
offer is made by the smaller entity. Amazingly, the terms are identical
to the offer by the larger entity, but the financial reimbursement is 50% greater,
truly-amazing. 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 repeat.
The reader would be hard-pressed to name one Customer-Endorsed, precision Ag
technology that has not undergone an experience with stages similar to that
outlined above, which is why no Customer-Endorsed Ag technology should be berated
for not being bought-out by a "big" company in Ag. Not being bought-out
in U.S. Agriculture typically indicates a lack of desperation more than anything
else.
And what about the Actual Performance Standards of those "objective,
unchallenged authorities of Ag", who use taxpayer dollars to leisurely
do their development and who play God with the lives of those scientists who
use their own funds to do their own development? How many growers, how many
acres of farmland, and how much ground water have all benefited from their many,
many years of publicly-funded development efforts? Just what are their Actual
Standards of Performance? Well, a review of what these same critics/competitors
regard as "Fair" Tests (available in the document of the same name)
of Soil Doctor® Technology provides one view. Their Actual Contributions
to Growers and the Environment provide another.
Out of all the scientists (competitors) that have feigned "objectivity"
and proclaimed Soil Doctor® technology to be well below Their Standard
to intentionally interfere with CTI sales, business, and reputation; the
following comprise the ones who have made the most progress in development,
those who have come the closest to developing to completion a tangible technology
that might provide Tangible Benefits to U.S. Growers or to U.S. Environment
--which, after all, is the Goal we all share. Their co-critics (more CTI competitors)
have brought even less Precision Agriculture technologies to growers or U.S.
farmland. See for yourself if the Actual Performance Standards --Not
the lofty feigned or aspired ones, not the least successful ones, but the HIGHEST
of the CTI critics/competitors-- are up to yours.
Dr. John Hummel finished developing his on-the-go organic matter soil sensor
in the early '90s and licensed the technology to Ag-Med back in 1991. Where
is it now? Why isn't it providing benefits to growers and to their environment?
Who knows?
Dr. Larry Gaultney finished his on-the-go organic matter soil sensor development
on public funds in the '80s and licensed that technology to Tyler back in 1989.
Where is it now? Why isn't it providing benefits to growers and to their environment?
Who knows?
As for Dr. Alfred Blackmer, his Hach Nitrate Test Kit was perhaps summed up
best by Dr. Gyles Randall of Minnesota, when he referred to it as "A Waste
of a Good Tackle Box". More technically speaking however, the kit --when
used as directed, with the accompanying protocol-- typically results in a Yield
Loss of Six Bushels per Acre.
In spite of the ho-hum development track-record in soil sensing, analyses, variable
rate application, end-user nutrient management, and end-user environment-protection
--over many, many years, and on tax-payer dollars--; these CTI critics/competitors
(and their co-critic/competitor colleagues who have attained even less market-visible
success) remain --in the eyes of some journalists, technical conferences, Ag
entities, etc., etc.-- the unchallenged, "objective" authorities--
in Precision Ag's soil sensing, analyses, and variable rate application; while
CTI technology, its customers, and the independent university and government
researchers who have proven--that the technology is a reliable, powerful tool
for efficiently managing Ag-Inputs-- remain relatively unacknowledged. Why?
You figure it out.
Is any of that "Good" for Ag or "Good" the Environment?
How could it be?
Does anyone care? Growers do.
Also See On Being a Scientist to read about several
Real Scientists and more examples of those who abuse their positions of public
trust by conducting research which is either sloppy or unethical.